The al Qaedaization of Africa: Boko Haram

Continuing with what I started Thursday, I want to consider in this post the purported "links" between Boko Haram and other jihadist organizations, particularly those operating in Africa. Since General Ham  did not last week provide any evidence backing up his allegations I must turn elsewhere. 

For this post, I am going to use J. Peter Pham's report on Boko Haram from April of this year. I do not use Pham's report because it provides easy fodder for my criticisms, but because it is among the most detailed and balanced papers on the group's history and ideology. Pham,the director of the Atlantic Council’s Michael S. Ansari Africa Center and former adviser on Africa to the 2008 McCain campaign, is a serious scholar and a well-regarded expert on Africa.

At the outset, I want to stress that I am not arguing that there are no links between Boko Haram and other African jihadist groups. What I will argue there is little concrete evidence that such links -- and particularly operational and logistical links -- actually exist.

Pham, to be fair, is not taking a "hard" position on this matter:

While one should be cautious about asserting connections between different terrorist organizations and other militant groups in the absence of credible evidence, one should also be wary of arbitrary distinctions and classifications that do little justice to more fluid realities.

He is correct to advice caution, but what about his claims of the fluidity of the situation? First, this is not an unreasonable claim. Overlapping membership and loose organizational ties have long been a hallmark of al Qaeda: the organization was founded by members of Egyptian and Algerian jihadi groups and in the nineties moved in and out of the group. But, this is not necessarily true of all jihadi groups, particularly those in Africa. Second, Boko Haram appears to be motivated by local concerns. The group's aim is to transform Nigeria -- or at least its northern states -- into a Salafist Islamic government. The group does sees itself struggle as linked to other Salafist insurgencies, but it does not appear to be calling for global jihad against the far enemy.

However, as with any insurgency, the group's membership and mid-level commanders may disagree over the aims and scope of the struggle, with some seeking to attack the "far enemy." Boko Haram is certainly anti-western -- the group's name is Hausa for "western education is blasphemy" -- and was behind the attack against UN headquarters in Abuja. Thus, Pham's comment about the fluidity of the organization is warranted. However, we should not overstate this: Boko Haram has largely focused its violence against Nigerian security forces as well as local Christians.

Turning now to the evidence Pham presents about Boko Haram's connections with other armed jihadist organizations. First, what evidence is there that al Qaeda proper -- i.e. bin Laden's group -- is linked to Boko Haram? 

...the successful establishment or acquisition of an active affiliate in Sub-Saharan Africa has been a goal of al Qaeda for some time. In June 2006, for example, Sada al-Jihad (Echo of Jihad), the magazine published by what was then al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, published a lengthy article by Abu Azzam al-Ansari entitled “Al-Qaeda is Moving to Africa.” The author was quite upfront about the jihadist agenda for Africa: “There is no doubt that al-Qaeda and the holy warriors appreciate the significance of the African regions for the military campaigns against the Crusaders. Many people sense that this continent has not yet found its proper and expected role and the next stages of the conflict will see Africa as the battlefield.”

We’re here in the realm of pure claims-making. Al Qaeda wants to establish a base in Africa, but there’s no evidence that they have contacts with Boko Haram, despite the claims of the Nigerian Secret Security Service. In general, the "franchising" of al Qaeda may be grossly overstated. Even the founding of “al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” and the declared allegiance of al Shabaab to al Qaeda are were likely little more than re-branding efforts. Al Qeada -- the actual organization founded by bin Laden and currently grinding down in Pakistan -- has neither been able to successfully branch out beyond rhetorical associations, nor has it mounted successful operations in Africa since 2002. 

Links between Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb are far more plausible. But here too there is little concrete evidence, simply more talk:

The head of al Qaeda’s North African franchise stated that his group would provide Boko Haram with weapons, training, and other support in order to expand its own reach into Sub-Saharan Africa not only to gain “strategic depth,” but also to “defend Muslims in Nigeria and stop the advance of a minority of Crusaders.” At the time, this claim was widely dismissed, both because Droukdel was known for outsized ambitions and he was having difficulties with the more dynamic southern commanders within AQIM.

There are two points that should be stressed here. First, Droukdel is making a claim about something that hadn’t happened at the time. He did not say he had provided weapons and training, only that he would -- or rather that he would have like to.

Second, Pham points out that the AQIM commander is considered to have “outsized ambitions,” therefore skepticism is warranted. Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, a.k.a. Abdelmalek Droukdel, took control over the Algerian Salafist group for Prayer and Combat during a low point in the insurgent organizations career. His plan to revitalize the group centered on rebranding. As the New York Times reported in 2008:

Hiding in the caves and woodlands surrounding this hill-country town, Algerian insurgents were all but washed up a few years ago. 

Their nationalist battle against the Algerian military was faltering. “We didn’t have enough weapons,” recalled a former militant lieutenant, Mourad Khettab, 34. “The people didn’t want to join. And money, we didn’t have enough money.” 

Then the leader of the group, a university mathematics graduate named Abdelmalek Droukdal, sent a secret message to Iraq in the fall of 2004. The recipient was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, and the two men on opposite ends of the Arab world engaged in what one firsthand observer describes as a corporate merger. 

Today, as Islamist violence wanes in some parts of the world, the Algerian militants — renamed Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb — have grown into one of the most potent Osama bin Laden affiliates, reinvigorated with fresh recruits and a zeal for Western targets.

Of course, things didn't quite work out for AQIM. According to the Jamestown Foundation, the group declined precipitously since its 2008 "merger," through a combination of effective counterterrorist efforts by the Algerian government and the group's decent into criminality. (Droukdel, incidentally, appears to moderating his views somewhat: last month he recommended the "gradual" implementation of Sharia in Mali.)

Certainly, AQIM's profile would rise if it were to latch on to a more popular insurgency. But, there appears to be little concrete evidence that it has in fact moved beyond rhetorical links with Boko Haram. This may simply mean that such evidence has either not been uncovered. Or it may mean that cooperation between Algerian insurgents and Boko Haram is nonexistent. 

Militants often live in a sort of fantasy world -- they see themselves as soldiers engaged in titanic struggles, in global revolutions. But they are often politically savvy. They know that such grandiose statements will get airplay, especially in the West, and will therefore boost their profile. This is especially useful when the militants are involved in factional struggles against more parochially minded rivals. Making global claims may thus merely be a means of outbidding, of gaining stature within their own group by appearing more ambitious.

But AQIM isn't the only group with whom Boko Haram is accused of forging links with. Pham offers some tantalizing evidence that they've hooked up with Somalia's al Shabaab:

[In August 2001] Boko Haram had issued a statement in which it boasted ominously for the first time of ties to jihadists in Somalia: “Very soon, we will wage jihad . . . our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable"... 

In the aftermath of the government crackdown in 2009, [Boko Haram leader Mamman] Nur is believed to have gone to Somalia, where he and his followers trained in al Shabaab camps and forged links with transnational jihadist networks. He returned to Nigeria in early 2011 and is alleged by Nigerian authorities, who placed a 25 million naira ($175,000) bounty on his head, to have masterminded the attack on the UN building in Abuja. Certainly Boko Haram spokesmen have boasted of their ties with militants in Somalia, links that have been confirmed by African Union forces in that country.

Here we may be on firmer ground: member of the organization are claiming to have received training from al Shabaab. However, the training of Boko Haram militants in Somalia is probably a thing of the past, especially since the Somali the main al Shabaab training camps have apparently been have been destroyed as part of the larger military offensive  by African Union forces.

More interesting is the allegation that between 2007 and 2009 -- when Boko Haram operatives were alleged to have gone to Somalia for training -- al Shabaab was itself being trained in making IEDs and suicide tactics in Eritrea by that nation's intelligence services. If the Somali group was sending its own militants abroad for training, it would seem odd that Boko Haram was going to Somalia for similar training. One might wonder whether or not Boko Haram propagandists were boasting of training with al Shabaab -- which at the time was militarily ascendant -- to increase the group's profile and prowess.

Incidently, the Nigerian Secret Security Services have claimed that Boko Haram received training in Afghanistan from the Taliban, though American intelligence officials consider this unlikely. After all, the Taliban themselves train in Pakistan.  

Beyond these links, Pham argues that key characteristics of Boko Haram itself suggest links with insurgent groups and with global jihad, though not necessarily operational connections:

… Mohammed Yusuf’s former deputy, Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau, who was thought to have been killed during the 2009 uprising, surfaced in a video that might be described as “classic al Qaeda.” Wearing a headdress and framed by an AK-47 and a stack of religious books, Shekau proclaimed himself the new head of Boko Haram and promised vengeance: “Do not think jihad is over. Rather jihad has just begun.” Significantly, he threatened attacks not only against the Nigerian state, but also against “outposts of Western culture.” In a published manifesto, Shekau linked the jihad being fought by Boko Haram with jihadist efforts globally, especially that of “the soldiers of Allah in the Islamic State of Iraq.

We should not read too much into these symbolic connections. The fact that a Boko Haram leader presented himself in a “classic al Qaeda” manner doesn’t tell us anything about actual links with bin Laden's organization. Boko Haram has also referred to itself as a Nigerian “Taliban,” but this doesn't mean they are a Taliban "affiliate." The symbols and terminology of global jihad are available to anyone and provide groups not only with a powerful frame of reference, but a salient set of symbolic resources for recruitment and image management.

The symbolic linking of Boko Haram’s struggle to global jihad may be nothing more than an attempt to inspire followers, to provide a local insurgency with greater meaning. This is especially common among insurgencies inspired by religion, which sociologist Mark Jurgensmeyer calls “cosmic war.” A similar rhetorical linking occurred during the 1970s, when European, Japanese, and American radicals saw their own struggles as part of a global revolution centered in the global south. It also happens among nationalist insurgencies: Irish republicans and radical Basque nationalists identify their struggles with that of the Kurds, Palestinians, Sri Lankan Tamils, and others engaged in wars of “national liberation.” But, these links are purely rhetorical and symbolic in most cases, and only rarely entail concrete exchanges of material and knowhow.

Insurgencies give rise to their own styles and fashion, revolutionary chic. In the seventies, western radicals wore military jackets and berets á la Che Guevara. In the nineties, young Basque militants wore keffiyehs inspired by the Palestinian intifada. This doesn’t tell us much about actual organizational links though.

Another link Pham highlights is the use of particular violent tactics of Boko Haram that have long been a "hallmark" of jihadi organizations:

]Boko Haram] has clearly absorbed the signature tactic of some of [al Qaeda] the use of vehicle-borne IEDs in repeated attacks against high-profile public targets, resulting in a spectacular increase in casualties, especially in cases where the bombs are deployed in near-simultaneous or otherwise coordinated attacks. At the very least, the existence of suicide attacks indicates some level of foreign influence since such episodes had been practically unknown in Africa until recent years when they became a part of AQIM’s repertoire.

Tactics are inherently modular and replicable. They can be used by anyone. The car bomb has been used by a plethora of groups, from anarchists to nationalists, jihadis to American rightwingers. The same came be said with the suicide bomb attack, which was perfected by the Tamil Tigers. The fact that Shia militants introduced the tactic into the Lebanese civil war did not stop radical socialists from using it. Mexican cartels were inspired by al Qaeda in Iraq to use decapitation as a means to terrorize their opponents and rivals. The modularity suggests nothing about links, only influence, as Pham alludes to.

Again, I am not claiming that no links exist. I am, however, suggesting that we should be skeptical. Boko Haram is responsible for atrocious attacks and has killed many Nigerians, both Christian and Muslim. But, as I have argued before, both Western counterterrorism officials and their African counterparts have an interest in highlighting and perhaps even exaggerating alleged connections between groups. Standards of evidence are incredibly low when dealing with terrorism, for reasons that are both good and bad. I'll be returning to this theme in future posts.